Connecting software to Asanable
Asanable is Accountable’s kanban board — boards, columns, cards referenced as AI-42. Four doors let other software work with it: Claude reads the boards through an MCP connector, Asanable pushes a signed webhook when a card changes, a small REST API lets a program read one card and post its answer back as a comment, and one named integration — Aikido Security — sends findings in. This page is public so that you can read it before deciding whether you want an account.
MCP connector
Ask Claude what is on a board — or to comment, create a card or move one, as you. Connected in four clicks from claude.ai’s connector settings.
Read the setup →Outgoing webhooks
12 card events, POSTed to your URL as signed JSON, retried on a widening gap. With a verification snippet you can paste.
Build a receiver →Agents & the REST API
The loop: receive a webhook, read the card over /api/v1/, post the result back as a comment and record it as a field — all under a named machine account. Six endpoints, three scopes, the full response schema including attachments, and a Node handler you can run.
Incoming: Aikido Security
The door that goes the other way. Aikido opens a security finding, POSTs a signed webhook, and Asanable files a card a developer can act on — one card per issue.
See what arrives →Incoming: GitHub pull requests
A pull request on a branch called fix/AI-1867-x shows on AI-1867 as a section with its state and its review, and says merged when it merges. It records, notifies nobody, and deliberately never moves a card.
What none of them will do
Nothing here can edit a card’s content, or delete anything. The REST API has exactly three writes — post a comment, set a field on a card, and post a version of a card’s AI review — and it cannot change a title, a description, an assignee, a due date, a label or a column. The MCP connector’s writes (a comment, a card, a subtask, a move between columns — amendments 240/291/294/311) act only as the member who authorised the connection, never anonymously. Webhooks only ever report that something happened.
Field writes were added in amendment 225, and the condition on them is the same one that had ruled them out: every change names whoever made it. A card’s activity log now reads “Invoice Checker set AI Reviewed to Yes”, with the machine account’s own name and colour, exactly as its comments carry them — and setting a field needs its own scope, so no token minted for commenting gained the power.
The AI review was added in amendment 247, and it is the one write that is deliberately quiet. A reviewing agent used to post its analysis as a comment, which paged everyone following the card every time the ticket changed; it now goes into a versioned section of the card that names the machine account beside every version and notifies nobody. It has its own scope too, so the same rule holds: the credential that posts reviews is not the credential that could post comments.
The two incoming integrations do write, and they are the exception that shows the rule rather than a hole in it: each is one named service, wired up by an operator who holds its signing secret — Aikido filing into one column of one board an operator named, GitHub commenting only about pull requests inside the organisation’s own repositories, a fork’s being ignored precisely so that “anybody on the internet” is not a way to put a remark on a card. Neither is an endpoint anybody can call, and there is nothing here that would let you become one.
The rule behind all of it is worth reading once: every write in Asanable is attributable to somebody who can be asked about it. A comment satisfies that on its face — it carries its author’s name and avatar on the card. A field did not, which is why programs could not set one; now the activity log records who set it, so it does, and it is allowed. A title, a description, an assignee or a column move still have no such answer, so they are still nobody’s to change but a person’s.
Nothing is provisioned from outside. A member authorises their own Claude connection, an admin adds a webhook endpoint, an admin mints an API token for a machine account they created (or a member mints a read-only one for themselves), an operator pastes Aikido’s secret into the deployment, and an operator pastes GitHub’s. There is no endpoint that hands out any of the five, which is why this page can be public without being a way in.
